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The nature of organizational change and the value of headquarters is derived from a
model with costs of delay, vested interests and costs of organizational change. The value of
headquarters is derived from imposed organizational change. It is viewed as an institution
which is able to prevent surplus reducing endogenous commitment. Imposed organizational
change is predicted in circumstances where the desired change is not urgent, the loss of
accepting lower offers than in the past is above a certain level, and the costs of imposed
change are lower than the costs of delay. Delay occurs and change will be voluntary in these
circumstances when the situation is not perceived as urgent and costs of imposed change are
high. Voluntary organizational change occurs immediately when the desired change is
perceived to be urgent. Case studies are presented along these lines of thought.
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND VESTED INTERESTS
1 Introduction
Organizational change is a recurring phenomenon. Popular press accounts report
frequently about mergers, divestitures, replacements of CEO’s, organizational restructuring,
and so on. A puzzling feature of these organizational changes is why they often require huge
amounts of resources, even when everybody knows and is aware that a change could in
principle be realized at negligible costs. Why did Apple and IBM take their brightest engineers
outside the existing organizations and place them in a far away, new laboratory to work on
the next generation of computers? Why are new departments created in an university when
the same new courses could have been offered within the existing structure?
A second key aspect of restructuring enterprises is the timing of its implementation.
It is observed that there are many situations in which considerable delay occurs in actually
implementing a desirable organizational change. Jensen (1993) provides many examples. He
estimates for General Motors ’an opportunity loss of over $ 100 billion in its R&D and capital
expenditure program over the eleven-year period 1980 to 1990’ in postponing desirable
changes. However, there are also several examples in which organizational change seems
to have taken place without (much) delay. Examples are General Electric, General Dynamics
and Sealed Air (Jensen, 1993).
A third puzzling aspect regarding organizational change is that all the involved parties
acknowledge after the implementation that everybody knew already that something had to be
changed. Postrel and Rumelt (1992, p398) observe
’Why is organizational change so difficult? In particular, why is it so difficult for
firms to imitate best practice even after it has been recognized for a
considerable time?’
A common starting point for analysing the above phenomena is nowadays formed by
models featuring a conflict of interest and asymmetric information. Principal-agent and
transaction costs analyses are prominent examples. This paper maintains the feature of a
conflict of interest, but abandones the ingredient of asymmetric information. A model is
presented with complete information, costs of organizational change, costs of delay,3
endogenous commitment and a deadline. The fruits of organizational change have to be
divided between two local parties, e.g. employees or business units. There is a common
interest to realize the benefits of organizational change in the sense of having a pie which is
as large as possible. There is an element of conflict because each party tries to get a share
of the pie which is as large as possible. It is assumed that there is a third party, called
headquarters. They decide whether organizational change will be imposed by them or left to
the local parties. Headquarters is endowed with the power to either prevent the manoeuvring
for individual shares by imposing organizational change or to allow voluntary organizational
change to be reached by the two local parties (which may involve delay). Imposed
organizational change comes at a cost C. Examples are dulled motivation of and/or resistence
against such a change, dynamic economies of scale lost in changing job assignments, and
costs of organizational structure changes.
Voluntaryorganizationalchangeisrepresentedbyanalternatingofferbargaininggame
of complete information with a deadline and endogenous commitment. The deadline entails
that the benefits of organizational change evaporate when the parties don’t come to an
agreement before the deadline. It represents that organizational change can not be postponed
indefinitely, i.e. external pressures create a deadline in internal bargaining processes.
Endogenous commitment is interpreted as a vested interest. It reflects the empirical
observation that the history of the bargaining process is important in determining a negotiators’
prestige. The negotiator will suffer a loss of reputation when he accepts an offer which is
worse than the best (public) offer which has been received in the past. This feature is
modelled by the notion of endogenous commitment in the form of non-stationarity of the
bargaining process, i.e. it is assumed that a proposal is not accepted when its terms are
worse than the best offer which has been received in the past.
The deadline and endogenous commitment may result in delay in reaching an
agreement. Delay is costly because it reduces the pie to be shared between the two parties.
It is modelled by a discount factor, which may represent either the pressure from capital or
product markets, the strength of the internal control system, or the perception of the urgency
of the situation by the local parties. Delay may occur despite its associated costs because the
proposer in the first period may have to offer such a high share to the other party in order to
get immediate acceptance that delay is preferred. Delay emerges by offering a too small share
to the other party. The most attractive proposal for the proposer to get delay is to offer the
responder a share 0, because this prevents that a vested interest (endogenous commitment)
is built up. This proposal will be rejected by the other party in the first period. The extra4
benefits of reaching an immediate agreement are not sufficient in these circumstances to
compensate the proposer of the first period for his disadvantageous position in the second
period due to the endogenous commitment aspect of his first period proposal. The proposer
claims the whole surplus in order to prevent that a vested interest for the other party is
created. The parties move to the second period and reach agreement.
It is shown that organizational change can be of three types. It will be either voluntary
and delayed, or immediate and imposed, or immediate and voluntary. It will be delayed when
the desired change is not perceived as being urgent and the loss of accepting lower offers
than in the past is above a certain level, whereas the costs of immediate organizational
change are high. The involved parties formulate unacceptable proposals for each other in
order to prevent that a more reasonable proposal will create a favorable endogenous
commitment for the other party. Immediate change which is desirable for the whole
organization is thereby postponed. The second possibility is that organizational change is
immediate and imposed by headquarters. The benefits of preventing the development of an
unfavorable bargaining position outweighs the costs of delay for the directly involved parties
when there is not much urgency with respect to organizational change and reputation loss of
accepting lower offers than in the past is above a certain level. However, delay will be
prevented in this situation by headquarters by an imposed organizational change when the
costs of the change are lower than the costs of delay. The value of headquarters is that it is
able to impose organizational change in order to break endogenous commitments. The third
possibility is immediate voluntary organizational change. It occurs when the desired change
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Figure 1: Organizational change, urgency and costs of imposed change
Another way of characterizing our results is to formulate them in terms of the value
added by headquarters. There is no role for headquarters in the above model when the
situation is urgent or the loss of reputation is low, because the local parties know that delay
would be very costly. The response of the local parties is to adopt a policy of change5
voluntarily and immediately. Headquarters also doesn’t add value when the situation is not
urgent and the costs of an imposed organizational change are high. Delay is costly, but
preventing it is even more costly. Organizational change will therefore not be imposed and
delay will occur. The only situation in which headquarters adds value is when the desirability
of change is not perceived by the local parties as being urgent, the reputation loss is above
a certain level, and the costs of imposed organizational change are low. Value is created by
breaking inefficient endogenous commitments.
This article can be positioned in the management and economics literature in several
ways. Rumelt et.al. (1994) characterize the field of strategic management by five research
questions:
- How do firms behave?
- Why are firms different?
- What are the functions of headquarters in a multibusiness firm?
- What determines success or failure in international competition?
- Why are organizations so resistant to change?
This article addresses explicitly the third and fifth questions of the research agenda of the field
of strategic management. The function of headquarters that will be stressed is the creation of
value by preventing that harmful positions are chosen by local parties in the negotiation
process about a desirable organizational change. Organizations are resistant to change when
costs associated with this policy are high compared to the costs of delay. Hypotheses are
formulated regarding the circumstances in which this is expected to happen.
A second way of positioning this article is to view it as a contribution to the Coase
program. The celebrated Coase theorem (1960) states that every assignment of property
rights results in a Pareto efficient allocation in the absence of bargaining inefficiencies and
wealth constraints. The implied research agenda is that a fruitful starting point for research on
organizations is the investigation of the assumptions of efficient bargaining and no wealth
constraints.Thispaperaddressesaparticularrelaxationoftheefficientbargainingassumption.
The usual assumption of stationarity of the bargaining process is relaxed. Later bargaining
periods are not anymore necessarily identical to (or independent of) earlier bargaining periods,
because current proposals influence the payoff structure in future bargaining periods. History
matters because the rejection of a proposal by a player can not be followed by an acceptance
of a worse proposal in the future by the same player without a loss (of reputation). (Inefficient)6
delay may be the result. Endogenous commitment does therefore not only have a
distributional effect, but also a real effect in reducing the surplus which will be divided. A role
for the institution of headquarters emerges. It may be able to diminish the reduction of the
available surplus by breaking endogenous commitments.
Strategic management research is often distinguished between a process or content
orientation. Chakravarthy and Doz (1992) characterize the difference by that ’The latter
subfield focuses exclusively on what strategic positions of the firm lead to optimal performance
undervaryingenvironmental contexts.In contrast,strategyprocess researchisconcerned with
how a firms’s administrative systems and decision processes influence its strategic positions.’
Our model can be viewed as a contribution to the process oriented branch of the strategic
management literature. More specifically, it focusses on bargaining problems in decision
processes.
Finally, the model can be viewed as endogenously deriving whether the nature of
organizational change will be top-down or bottom-up. Top-down change is predicted in
circumstances which are perceived as not urgent, entail at least some loss of prestige of local
negotiators in the bargaining process when offers are accepted which are lower than the
highest offer in the past and the costs of imposed organizational change don’t exceed the
reduction in surplus due to delay. All other situations will face bottom-up change, which is
either immediate or delayed. It is delayed when there is no sense of urgency and the costs
of imposed change by headquarters exceed the costs of delay. Otherwise it will be immediate.
Section 2 presents the model. The results are presented in section 3. Several cases
are presented in section 4 to illustrate the main ideas. Section 5 contrasts the above
arguments and their implications with diverse strands in the literature. Finally, section 5
provides some conclusions.7
2 Model
A two period game of complete information and endogenous commitment is presented
to illustrate the claims of section 2. Both periods consist of three stages. The decision
regarding organizational change is taken in the first stage of the first period. The game ends
when it is decided to implement organizational change. A bargaining (sub)game in the spirit
of Rubinstein (1982) starts between the two parties when the choice in the first period is not
to change the organization.
The fruits of organizational change are normalized to one. The proposer formulates a
proposals to divide the surplus and this is either accepted or rejected by the responder. It is
assumed without loss of generality that person 1 is the proposer. The game ends when the
proposal is accepted. If the proposal is rejected, then the game moves to the second period.
Figure 2 represents the sequence of moves in the first period. The first (second) component
of each vector represents the payoff of person 1 (2).
1 Imposed organizational change by
headquarters is reflected by the choice Y(es), whereas no imposed organizational change is
reflected by N(o). The payoff of the parties will depend on d and C, i.e. the costs of
organizational change, when imposed organizational change is chosen by headquarters. It is
assumed that the share of the surplus received by the two parties when organizational change
is imposed is identical to the share of the surplus received when no organizational change is
imposed. The costs of imposed organizational change are shared equally. If decision N
doesn’t result in delay, then the payoff of person 1 (2) when headquarters chooses Y is equal
to the subgame perfect equilibrium value of s (1-s) minus half of the costs of imposed
organizational change.
1 A straightforward way to include the payoff of headquarters is to set it equal to a share of
the pie which is up for division, where is close to 0. Person 1 and 2 furnish this amount
equally. This specification secures the uniqueness of equilibrium. However, the payoff of
headquarters is left out because it simplifies notation and it would not enhance the
understanding of the results.8
Figure 2: Extensive form of the first period
A straightforward way to include the payoff of headquarters is to set it equal to a share of
the pie which is up for division, where is close to 0. Person 1 and 2 furnish this amount
equally. This specification secures the uniqueness of equilibrium. However, the payoff of
headquarters is left out because it simplifies notation and it would not enhance the
understanding of the results.
Nature determines first who will be the proposer and responder in this final period. This
is done randomly and each party is equally likely to be assigned the role of proposer. The
proposer chooses a division of the pie and the responder either accepts or rejects it. The
game will end after the decision of the responder because the deadline has been reached.
The payoffs are determined by the feature of endogenous commitment and a discount factor
d [0,1], which is taken to be the same for both players. Endogenous commitment (Stahl,
1990 and Fershtman and Seidmann, 1993) entails that a proposal will have a lower value for
the responder when it offers less than the highest offer in the past. It is assumed that the
value of an offer for the responder is reduced by L when the offer is worse than the best offer
in the past. Both parties earn 0 when the proposal is rejected in the final period. Figure 3
reflects the second period. Endogenous commitment is represented in the payoffs by the
indicator function I(s,1](r).
1 The definition of the indicator function is
1 Fershtman and Seidmann use the specification dr(1-I(s,1](r)) as payoff for person 2 when
person 1 proposes in the second period.9
I(s,1](r) = 1 , r (s,1]
0 , otherwise.
Figure 3: Extensive form of second period
The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this game is determined by backward
induction. We start therefore with period 2, given the decisions in period 1. Suppose person
1 proposes in period 1 that he gets a share s. The offer to person 2 is therefore 1-s. If person
1 is assigned the role of proposer in period 2, then the feature of endogenous commitment
limits the range of offers which will be accepted in the second period by person 2. The
subgame perfect equilibrium strategy in the second period when person 1 is assigned the role
of proposer is
person 1: r = s ,s>1 - L
1-L , s £ 1-L
person 2: yes.
If person 2 is assigned the role of proposer in period 2, then he will claim and get the whole
surplus by asking t = 1, because person 1 has not received an offer in the previous period and
has therefore no vested interest (endogenous commitment) built up. Person 2 knows in the
first period that his discounted expected payoff in the second period is (1-s+1) d/2= sd/2 when
s > 1-L and (L+1) d/2 when s £ 1-L. This is reflected in figure 4.10
Figure 4: Extensive form with second period SPE payoffs
3 Equilibrium and comparative statics
The appendix shows the calculation of the subgame perfect equilibrium. It proceeds
in the familiar way, i.e. the method of backward induction is used. Three types of subgame
perfect equilibria are distinguished. First, delay will emerge in the bargaining process when
it is not very costly, i.e. the discount factor is close to 1. Headquarters will tolerate this delay
when the costs of imposed organizational change outweigh the benefits of preventing delay.
Second, organizational change will be imposed by headquarters when delay is not costly and
the cost associated with imposed organizational change are even lower. Imposed organizatio-
nal change is a way to break endogenous commitments. Finally, immediate agreement occurs
voluntarily when the cost of delay are large, i.e. organizational change is urgent. The
responder in the first period is in these circumstances not able to elicit an endogenous
commitment which improves his bargaining position in the second period to such an extent
that it compensates for the costs of delay. Headquarters will not intervene in order to prevent
the costs C.11
Figure 5: Subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs when headquarters has chosen N.
Figure 5 presents the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of person 1 and 2 as a
function of the parameters d and L, when headquarters has chosen N. The first (second) term
in brackets in each region presents the expected payoff of person 1 (2).
Proposition 1: A decrease in d never causes a switch from immediate change to delayed
change.
An increase in the urgency of the situation makes delay more costly. The parties respond by
choosing actions in the first period which result in immediate change.
Proposition 2: The share of the surplus received by person 1 doesn’t increase when L
increases.
The share of the surplus received by person 1 is not influenced by the level of L when s>1-L
is chosen. An increase in the reputation loss L never reduces the share of the surplus
received by person 2 when s£1-L, because bids r of person 1 are limited to 1-L in order to get
acceptance in the second period when person 1 tries to formulate bids in the first period which12
are accepted. Person 1 has to take this into account when s is chosen, which will reduce the
level of the subgame perfect equilibrium choice of s in the first period.
Proposition 3: An increase in L never causes a switch from delayed change to immediate
change.
This follows from proposition 2. If d>3-Ö5 and L increases above d/(2-d), then L doesn’t
influence the share received by person 1 anymore because the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the case s>1-L applies. If d>3-Ö5, then an increase in L will reduce the share of the surplus
received by person 1 when L is small. Further increases in L will force person 1 to lower s to
such an extent in order to get acceptance in the first period that delay is preferred.
Proposition 4: The share of the surplus received by person 1 doesn’t increase when d
increases.
A decrease in urgency increases the payoff associated with delay for person 1 and 2. Person
1 has therefore to lower its bid s in order to get acceptance in the first period.
Proposition 5: The first-mover position of person 1 is not attractive (in terms of payoffs) when
(1-d)/d < L < min (d/(2-d), 2(1-d)/d)o rde(.5,3-Ö5) and L>d/(2-d).
The driving forces behind this result are the propositions three and four. An increase in d as
well as L reduce the attractiveness of being in the position of person 1. The lower bound (1-
d)/d is equivalent to (2-(L+1)d)/2 < (L+1)d/2. The upperbound min (d/(2-d), 2(1-d)/d) excludes
the areas L>d/(2-d) and L>2(1-d)/d. The second subset of the parameter space is obvious.
The results have been presented in terms of the payoffs of person 1 and 2 in figure
5. It is assumed in figure 5 that headquarters has chosen N. This is also the subgame perfect
equilibrium strategy of headquarters when the payoffs in figure 5 add up to 1, i.e. there is no
delay when headquarters does not intervene. N is the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy
in these circumstances because costs C are prevented. The area in figure 5 where each party
earns d/2 entails delay when headquarters chooses N. Headquarters will impose organizatio-
nal change when d and L are above a certain value and the costs of imposed change are not
too large, i.e. C£1-d. Value is added by headquarters only in these circumstances. Figure 6
reflects the predictions in terms of the value added by headquarters for all possible parameter13
constellations.
C £ 1-d C>1-d
d£3 - 5, L ³d /(2-d) 0 0
d >3- 5 , L³2(1-d)/d 1-d-C 0
L<d /(2-d), L < 2(1-d)/d 0 0
Figure 6: Value added of headquarters
A final way of presenting our results is in terms of welfare. The welfare characterization
is provided in terms of transaction costs. They are defined as the difference in surplus
between the Pareto-efficient outcome and the equilibrium outcome. Transaction costs are zero
when the situation is urgent or the loss of reputation is small. Organizational change will occur
immediately,withoutinterferenceofheadquarters.TransactioncostsareCwhenheadquarters
imposes organizational change. There will be no delay in situations with lower costs of
imposed organizational change than the costs of delay, but this comes at a cost C. Finally,
transaction costs are equal to 1-d in circumstances where delay in less costly for the
organization than imposed organizational change. Figure 7 presents the size of the
transactions costs as a function of the parameters regarding urgency, loss of reputation and
costs of organizational change parameters.
C £ 1-d C>1-d
d£3 - 5, L ³d /(2-d) 0 0
d >3- 5 , L³2(1-d)/d C 1-d
L<d /(2-d), L < 2(1-d)/d 0 0
Figure 7: Transaction costs
The policy implication regarding endogenous commitment is that it is valuable to create
bargaining circumstances in which no public announcements are (allowed to be) made. It
seems that this is understood in both business and politics. The press is often completely14
blocked from information regarding the results during a negotiation process. Only the final
outcome is communicated. The above model suggests that this is a surplus generating
practice when the situation is not perceived as urgent and the loss of reputation associated
with accepting a bid which is lower than a public bid received in the past is above a certain
level (,i.e. L>2(1-d)/d).
4 Cases
Several case studies are presented in this section regarding the environment in which
a particular type of organizational change emerges. Cases regarding the establishment of new
departments as an example of imposed organizational change are the focus of analysis in
subsection 4.1. Cases regarding delayed organizational change are treated in subsection 4.2
Finally, subsection 4.3 treats cases in which voluntary organizational change has occured.
4.1 Imposed change
There are many examples of enterprises reorganizing themselves by creating new
departments or merging existing departments. Some examples regarding the creation of new
departments are the splitting up of an existing department into a production unit and a
research unit. The New York Times (1984) reported that ’For the first time since the early days
of the auto industry, the General Motors Corporation has bought a minority interest in a small
company rather than swallowing it whole’. Another example is Westinghouse and its
experience with the high tech firm Unimation. The Wall Street Journal (1984) reported about
researchers of Westinghouse that ’They learned that their financial incentives would be lower
under Westinghouse and they felt the time it took to make business decisions would lengthen’.
Williamson (1985) has reported about similar cases and concludes that ’large companies are
becoming increasingly aware that the bureaucratic apparatus they use to manage mature
products is less well-suited to supporting early stage entrepreneurial activity’. Another example
of the creation of a new unit comes from my own department at Tilburg University. An
evaluation of the economics research done in the Netherlands revealed that mainstream
economic theorizing was underrepresented. Tilburg university decided to fill this gap by
creating a new departmental unit to carry out this kind of research rather than doing this in the
existing groups. CentER was created in 1988. Our model predicts that the environment in
which new research (and development) departments emerge is characterized by low costs of15
delay from the viewpoint of the local parties and even lower costs of setting up these new
departments. These new units are created by headquarters.
A recent case in my department is the imposed merger between two groups. The
economics department at Tilburg University consisted until recently of six groups: business
economics, CentER, econometrics, information sciences, economics and social economics
2.
Changing student interest have created financial problems for the last two groups. This was
officially recognized by the budgetting system in 1988. The last group has not been able to
deal with this situation effectively and the prospects for doing so are not bright. One reason
is that the situation is not viewed as urgent by the persons involved, because they don’t carry
the financial problems. The board of (three) directors of the department has formulated a
proposal in which the two groups are urged to work out a voluntary merger. This proposal was
rejected by social economics and reluctantly accepted by economics. The rejection was
motivated by stressing the value of remaining a separate group in order to preserve their own
identity. Social economics was abolished by the board of directors in 1995. The costs of this
change are almost nothing, because it only entails some administrative adjustments.
4.2 Delay
A dominant approach for understanding delay is nowadays the principal-agent
framework with a conflict of interest and asymmetric information. Jensen (1993) is a prominent
contributor to this literature. The main source of delay is in his view due to the failure of
corporateinternalcontrolsystems,especiallyheadquarters,todealeffectivelywithasymmetric
information problems. However, it seems that he is somehow uneasy with his account of
companies which failed to implement some kind of organizational change when he writes (p.
848):
’Even when managers do acknowledge the requirement for exit,
it is often difficult for them to accept and initiate the shutdown
decision. For the managers who must implement these decisi-
ons, shutting plants or liquidating the firm causes personal pain,
creates uncertainty, and interrupts or sidetracks careers. Rather
2 Economics consists of micro economics, monetary economics, public finance and
international trade. Social economics consists of regional economics, labor economics,
development economics, political economy and economic history.16
than confronting this pain, managers generally resist such
actions as long as they have the cash flow to subsidize the
losing operations’.
An analysis focussing on vested interests instead of information problems provides
another explanation for some of the observations by Jensen. Kodak is an example. It recently
’appointed a chief financial officer well-known for turning around
troubled companies. (Unfortunately he resigned only several
months later - after, according to press reports, running into
resistance from the current management and board about the
necessity for dramatic change)’ (Jensen, p. 853).
Our model predicts that delay will occur in situations which are not urgent. Especially
organizations with free cash flow seem to be vulnerable to the emergence of this phenomena.
Jensen (p. 853) reports that some of these funds were used by Kodak and IBM in their
heydays to buy labor peace.
4.3 Immediate, voluntary change
Jensen provides also some counterexamples to his proposition about the failure of
corporate internal control systems. However, they seem to fit our model in that immediate,
voluntary change is predicted in situations which are perceived as urgent.
Jensen (p.853) observes that ’GE has accomplished a major strategic redirection,
eliminating 104,000 of its 402,000 person workforce (through layoffs or sales of divisions) in
the period 1980 to 1990 without the motivation of a threat from capital or product markets. But
there is little evidence to indicate this is due to anything more than the vision and persuasive
powers of Jack Welch rather than the influence of GE’s governance system’. Another example
is Sealed Air. CEO Dermot Dumphy ’created a crisis by voluntarily using the capital markets
in a leveraged restructuring’ (Jensen, p.854). These CEO’s definitely imposed change, but
they also seem to have been able to change the perception of local parties regarding the
urgency of change of the situation they are in, which triggered all kinds of local initiatives.17
5 Related literature
The explanation for imposed organizational change in this paper is that it provides an
inexpensive way for headquarters to break endogenous commitments in order to prevent
costly delay. Delay will occur when its costs for the organization are lower than the costs of
organizational change imposed by headquarters, despite the availability of all relevant
information to the involved parties. Some assumptions underlying these results are complete
information, conflicting interests, independent preferences, time consistent decisions and
unbounded rationality. It is attractive that the above results are obtained within a model with
these simplifying assumptions. However, other relevant organizational change problems and
solutions emerge in environments in which these assumptions do not hold. We will address
several of them in order to provide some guidance to related literature as well as a positioning
of the above model in the literature
3. Results will be discussed with respect to commitment
problems, asymmetric information, coordination problems, voting procedures, bounded
rationality, time inconsistent decisions, framing and changing utility functions.
5.1 Commitment problems
Organizational change will always emerge in the above model. The implementation
occurs immediately or with one period delay. Nothing has been said about the process of
implementation and the possibility of commitment problems in this process. Admati and Perry
(1991) show that this is also not necessary. It is always possible to construct an implementati-
on procedure with the same alternating move structure as in the above setup such that the
promises of both parties to contribute in the costs of the project are credible. A project can
always be implemented as long as the net benefits are positive, regardless the amount of
costs involved. (It is of course required that the parties are committed to this procedure.) The
contribution procedure specifies that both parties take turns in contributing small amounts of
costs till the total amount of costs has been reached. This result implies that the amount of
the costs does not have to be an impediment to organizational change as long as the benefits
are larger than the costs.
Coricelli and Milesi-Ferretti (1993) model a potential problem with radical (’big bang’)
programs, even though it is attractive from a production efficiency standpoint. Their argument
3 Contributions to economics are highlighted. Rumelt (1995) is good source for a characteriza-
tion of the issues regarding inertia and change in general.18
is related to the wealth constraint branch of the Coase program in that the government is
believed to step in with subsidies when there are too many layoffs, which can make hard
budget constraints non-credible. This commitment problem is more likely to occur when the
reform program is more drastic. A drastic change increases the probability that payoffs are
independent of their activities, i.e. the likelihood of a bad outcome is high, but workers believe
that they will not carry the burden of a performance below a certain level. Employees put in
effort to make organizational reform a success. It is argued that a ’big bang’ program may on
average result in lower levels of effort than a more gradual reform program. Workers know
that the likelihood of a positive relationship between their activities and payoffs is high when
the organizational reform process is gradual. This will result in more effort and increases the
probability that organizational change will be succesful.
5.2 Asymmetric information
There are various explanations for organizational change from an incentive perspective
in an environment with asymmetric information. Ickes and Samuelson (1987) propose that job
transfers in complex organizations are used to thwart the dynamic moral hazard problem of
the ratchet effect. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) use an adverse selection argument to explain
herd behavior in investment decisions. Deviant investment behavior is considered by the labor
market as a bad signal regarding an unknown characteristic of the manager. Good managers
may therefore follow the crowd rather than implement changes when their reputation as a
good decision maker is at stake, even when they know that the change is desirable. Delay will
be the result when the associated costs are not too large. Boot (1992) also uses a reputation
argument and argues that there is too little divestiture in equilibrium. Only managers of targets
with intermediate levels of asset specificity have to consider the takeover threat credible.
Cramton (1992) explains delay in bargaining by two-sided uncertainty.
Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) advance an influence cost hypothesis regarding
organizational change. They observe that the majority of divestitures concerns badly
performing departments. These departments face stronger incentives to engage in inefficient
rent seeking activities than relatively well performing departments. This is prevented by
divestiture. The influence approach may be viewed as a contribution to the wealth constraint
branch of the Coase program.
Dewatripont and Roland (1992) advance an adverse selection hypothesis regarding
the speed of transition. Beneficial change may be hindered because asymmetric information19
regarding the value of vested interests makes the required compensation payments too costly
in order to get a proposal adopted which involves change for everybody at the same time. The
optimal reform proposal is usually gradualism, i.e. an intertemporal compensation policy is in
general least costly.
5.3 Coordination problems
Identical and interdependent preferences in an environment with asymmetric
information are adopted by Farrell and Saloner (1985) to explain delay. Unattractive outcomes
may emerge because a critical mass of persons is needed to establish the move to a superior
outcome. Communication between the parties alleviates this coordination problem, but not
completely. Our model doesn’t have a role for communication because everything is known.
Farrell and Saloner (1986) have extended this argument to situations in which preferences are
not identical anymore. It becomes important how many persons adhere to the old organization
compared to those favoring a change. Delay results when too many persons are attached to
the current situation. Notice that the model of this paper does not consider the number of
people favoring a change to be the crucial variable, but the urgency of the situation, the loss
of reputation and the costs of imposed organizational change.
Bolton and Farrell (1990) examine the trade-off between the value of local, private
information and the costs of duplication or delay. Centralized decision making is predicted
when coordination problems feature more prominently than local information. These situations
are characterized as urgent and the value of centralization is derived from its ability to prevent
duplication or delay. This model seems to fit the observation that market systems are adopted
during times of peace, whereas societies switch to centralized decision making during war
time. Our model predicts the opposite regarding centralized decision making in urgent
situations, because there is a local conflict of interest and a clear sense of the direction of
desirable change, i.e. there is no coordination problem in the form of duplication or delay.
5.4 Voting procedures
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) focus on the importance of the voting procedure when
there is uncertainty regarding the gains and losses of reform. They show how individual
specific uncertainty can distort aggregate preferences. Uncertainty regarding the identity of
gainers and losers of the reform may drive so many individuals into opposing it that they20
overrule those in favor of a change. The opposite may also happen, i.e. a bad reform is
adopted. A status quo bias is present because implementing a reform generates new
information, i.e. the new information may result in repeal of the reform in a second vote,
whereas rejecting a reform generates no new information, which implies that the status quo
prevails. The source of the problem is that the weight of individual preferences regarding
reform is not perfectly aligned with the allocation of voting power in the aggregation procedure.
This suggests the value of autocratic decision making, which is often characterizing the
internal decision making regarding reform in firms. The leadership may therefore adopt a
reform which is met with ex ante hostility, due to many vested interests, but receives ex ante
support of the people involved. Uncertainty regarding the gains and losses of reform is not
considered in our analysis.
5.5 Bounded rationality
Heiner (1988) provides an explanation for delay in adjustment processes to changing
situations from a bounded rationality perspective. The cognitive capabilities of a person are
usually smaller than the complexity of the problem. Delay is attractive for such a person
because it reduces the probability of mistakenly adjusting either too soon or in the wrong
direction or at the wrong rate. Our model obtains delay in a model with complete rationality.
5.6 Time inconsistent decisions
This paper remains in the traditional domain of economics by considering time
consistent behavior, instant recognition of problems (i.e. unbounded rationality) and fixing the
utility function of individuals. However, it is not denied that valuable contributions to the subject
of this paper have been made along lines of thought outside this domain. Individuals make
dynamically inconsistent decisions in the model of Akerlof (1991) because present costs of
decisions are more salient in comparison with future costs. Tasks will be procrastinated until
tomorrow without foreseeing that when tomorrow comes, the required action will be delayed
again. One way for management of reducing these costs is to set schedules and deadlines.
5.7 Framing
The framing of decisions and the valuation of losses and gains has been studied21
extensively by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Their experiments show that small losses loom
much larger than small benefits. This makes it important to choose the reference point (i.e.
frame) to which future payoffs, either positive or negative, are compared. Endogenous
commitment can be interpreted as endogenizing the frame or reference point. The rejection
of an offer creates a new reference point to which future offers are compared. A current offer
which is worse than the best offer in the past creates a disutility which eliminates any positive
benefit of the receiver in the current offer.
Another implication is that the spacing in time of costs and benefits matters. It suggests
that all the costs be imposed at once, whereas benefits are spread out over time. Costs are
to be interpreted as not compensating the losers of organizational change for their less
attractive position in the new organization. Some support for this hypothesis is the claim of
Machiavelli (1513) that ’unjustices have to be committed all at once, then they are experienced
less: and benefits have to be given little by little, then they taste
better’.
5.8 Changing preferences
Anextensiveorganizational behaviorliteraturehas beendevoted totherecognition and
awareness aspects of change (Lewin, 1947). Individuals have to be convinced that a change
is desirable. A gradual process of transition is usually advocated. The objective seems to be
to change the attitude of people towards organizational restructuring by trying to change the
preferences (or utility function) of the members of the organization. Traditional economic
theory treats preferences as being fixed over time, whereas other social sciences are much
less inclined to make such an assumption. Issues like participation, education, communication
and indoctrination play therefore an important role in psychology and sociology.
6 Conclusions
A model of organizational change is presented with complete information, costs of
organizational change, costs of delay, endogenous commitment and a deadline. It is shown
that two scenarios for enterprise restructuring emerge when the change is not urgent. It is
delayed (imposed immediately) when the costs of imposed change are higher (lower) than the
costs of delay. The value of imposed organizational change is that it breaks endogenous
commitments. Organizational change will occur immediately and voluntarily when it is urgent.
Headquarters only adds value by imposing organizational change in order to break22
endogenous commitments in situations which are not perceived as being urgent and entail low
costs of change.
The focus has been on the character of organizational change and on identifying
situations in which headquarters adds value. It was not intended to provide a comprehensive
account of these phenomena, but to limit attention to a particular aspect in order to shed
another light on several empirical phenomena. Extensions to advance our knowledge and
understanding of organizational change and headquarters can therefore be readily pursued
in many directions, both theoretically and empirically.23
Appendix
The SPE of the bargaining stages of the game are determined. Consider first the case
s > 1-L. The proposal s by person 1 is accepted in the first period by person 2 when
1-s³(2-s) d/2
Û s £ 2(1-d)/(2-d).
This is feasible when 2(1-d)/(2-d) > 1-L, i.e. L > d/(2-d). Person 1 gets acceptance in the first
period and maximizes his payoff by asking 2(1-d)/(2-d). The alternative is to elicit a rejection.
The payoff maximizing proposal achieving this is asking s = 1 in the first period. The
discounted expected payoff of person 1 by asking s = 1 is d/2. Person 1 prefers agreement
in the first period above delay when
2(1-d)/(2-d) ³d /2
Ûd£3- 5 .
If L £d /(2-d), then s=2(1-d)/(2-d) is not large enough to be above the lower bound 1-L. Offers
higher than 2(1-d)/(2-d) will not be accepted by person 2 in period 1. The payoff maximizing
bid by person 1 in period 1 is therefore s=1.
The subgame perfect equilibrium when s > 1-L is
I fL>d /(2-d) and
d£3 - 5: first period: person 1: s = 2(1-d)/(2-d)
person 2: yes
second period: Nature chooses person 1:
person 1: r=s
person 2: yes
Nature chooses person 2:
person 1: yes
person 2: t=1.
d > 3 - 5: first period: person 1: s=1
person 2: no24
second period: Nature chooses person 1:
person 1: r=s
person 2: yes
Nature chooses person 2:
person 1: yes
person 2: t=1.
If L £d /(2-d): first period: person 1: s=1
person 2: no
second period: Nature chooses person 1:
person 1: r=s
person 2: yes
Nature chooses person 2:
person 1: yes
person 2: t=1.
The second case consists of s £ 1-L. The proposal s by person 1 is accepted in the
first period by person 2 when
1-s³(L+1) d/2
Û s £ (2-(L+1) d)/2.
Person 1 gets acceptance in the first period and maximizes his payoff by asking (2-(L+1)d)/2
when feasible bids (2-(L+1)d)/2 < 1-L, which is equivalent to L < d/(2-d), are considered. The
alternative is to elicit a rejection. The payoff maximizing proposal achieving this is asking s=1-
L in the first period. Person 1 will bid r=1-L in the second period. The expected discounted
payoff for person 1 by asking s=1-L is (1-L)d/2. Person 2 will earn (L-L+1)d/2=d/2 when the
bid s=(2-(L+1)d)/2 is rejected, which is less than the payoff (L+1)d/2 when it is accepted in the
first period. Person 1 prefers agreement in the first period above delay when
(2-(L+1)d)/2 ³ (1-L)d/2
Ûd£1.25
One possible feasible bid to be considered is s=(2-(L+1)d)/2=1-L. If s=(2-(L+1)d)/2=1-L then
there is no room left for person 1 to ask a higher bid in period 2 and get acceptance. This
raises the attractiveness of rejection in the first period for person 2, because the expected
payoff will be (L+1)d/2. However, this is not a higher payoff than the payoff associated with
accepting in the first period.
Suppose L > d/(2-d). Person 2 accepts all bids in the first period higher than the highest
feasible bid of person 1. Person 1 will bid the lowest possible bid, i.e. s=1-L.
The subgame perfect equilibrium is, when s £ 1-L and
L £d /(2-d) : first period: person 1: s = (2-(L+1)d)/2
person 2: yes
second period: Nature chooses person 1:
person 1:r=1 - L
person 2: yes
Nature chooses period 2:
person 1: yes
person 2:t=1 .
L>d /(2-d): first period: person 1:s=1 - L
person 2: yes
second period: Nature chooses person 1:
person 1:r=1 - L
person 2: yes
Nature chooses person 2:
person 1: yes
person 2:t=1 .
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game when there are no restrictions regarding the
choice of s in period 1 for person 1 is determined by choosing from the two cases the payoff
maximizing level of s for each possible combination of values of d and L. If L e [0,d/(2-d)], then
the subgame perfect equilibrium choice of s is realized in the case s £ 1-L when
(2-(L+1)d)/2 ³d /2
Û L £ 2(1-d)/d.26
If L e [0,d/(2-d)] and L>2(1-d)/2, then the subgame perfect equilibrium choice of s emerges in
the case s>1-L, i.e. s=1. If L>d/(2-d) and de[0,3- 5], then the subgame perfect equilibrium
choice of s is realized in the case s>1-L when
1-L < 2(1-d)/(2-d)
Û L>d /(2-d).
So, s=1-L is never a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy when L>d/(2-d) and d£3- 5. Finally,
if L>d/(2-d) and de(3- 5,1], then the subgame perfect equilibrium choice of s emerges in the
case s>1-L when
d/2 ³ 1-L
Û L ³ 1-d/2.
The curves L=1-d/2 and L=d/(2-d) intersect at d=3- 5, i.e. s=1-L is not a subgame perfect
equilibrium strategy.
The assumption regarding the division of the benefits and costs of organizational change
implies that
v1(d,L,C) = 2(1-d)/(2-d) - C/2 , d£3 - 5, L ³d /(2-d)
(1-C)/2 , d >3- 5 ,L³2(1-d)/d
(2- (L+1)d)/2- C/2 , L < d/(2-d),L < 2(1-d)/d
v2(d,L,C) = d/(2-d)-C/2 , d£3 - 5, L ³d /(2-d)
(1-C)/2 , d >3- 5 ,L³2(1-d)/d
(L+1)d/2-C/2 , L < d/(2-d),L < 2(1-d)/d
It follows immediately that the subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game entails
organizational change if and only if C £ 1-d ,d> 3 - 5 and L ³ 2(1-d)/d. Figure 1 summarizes
the results by defining low urgency as d > max (3 - 5, 2/(2+L)) and low costs as C £ 1-d .27
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